Henri Lefebvre (1968), 'The Marxian Concept of Praxis' in The Sociology of Marx, trans. Norbert Guterman, New York: Pantheon, pp. 25-58.

Karl Marx (1980) 'Theses on Feuerbach' (first written 1845), in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works in One Volume, London: Lawrence and Wishart (first published in 1968, Moscow: Progress Publishers). pp.28-31.

Karl Marx (1978) 'The German Ideology' in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, New York: Norton, pp. 146-200.


Despite Marx's claim that his use of the dialectic is the exact opposite to Hegel's, it is more productive to think of the relationship of Marx to Hegel as a dialectical one - one of conflict. Lefebvre says in one sense Marx continues Hegel, in another sense breaks with him (1968: 25). For example, the State for Hegel is that which holds society together, and is the culmination of human achievement. This follows the Hegelian approach to synthesis that eventually completes the dynamic relationship of thesis and antithesis. This is the infamous 'end of history' - a history that culminates in the present. Whereas in Marx's thinking, the State is also subject to historical conditions, hence is not complete and so requires continual dialectical analyses and action. It is the existing State that needs to be challenged. Marx simply insists that human consciousness is seen as a 'succession of changing stages and shifting moments' (becoming) and sees a contradiction in Hegel insisting on the end of history (1968: 28; privileging space over time). In Marx, both nature and history are conceived of historically (privileging time over space perhaps). Lefebvre explains that in Marx, time is both growth and development. In this sense, time is both quantitative in that it is continuous and predictable as well as qualitative in that it is discontinuous and proceeds in irregular leaps. This unpredictable element makes history full of the potential for fresh creation not simply a series of repetitive loops.

Praxis is defined in opposition to philosophy and philosophical contemplation (rather like the way Arendt sees action as more productive than contemplation alone - see those notes). Unlike praxis, philosophy in itself has no value and cannot change the world. Lefebvre says: 'To rise above the world by pure reflection is in reality to remain imprisoned in pure reflection' (1968: 32. note: these are words of warning for the traditional form of a phd as privileged knowledge). The problem of knowledge that philosophy attends too (and doctors of philosophy), is an abstraction of little consequence in the social realm. To Marx, in Theses on Feuerbach, the human subject is social, and society is active and interactive. This is characterised by Marx as: 
'Social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which mislead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice. [...] The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.' (1980: 30)

The much-quoted last sentence emphasises that praxis goes beyond philosophy (which is used by Lefebvre to justify the practical and applied nature of sociology - Marx is writing at a time when the sciences have not yet been compartmentalised). At its most extreme, this is a lame justification for positivism at the expense of speculation. According to Lefebvre, this is one criticism of Marxism in its tendency towards positivism at the expense of philosophical speculation - he accuses both Lucacs (his theory of class consciousness) and Gramsci (his theory of praxis as privileging the State) of conceiving of the end of philosophy (1968: 36-7; a reference to Hegel's end of history). Lurking in the background here is a more complex philosophical argument over the opposition of idealism and materialism (making reference to Marx's The German Ideology of 1845/6 and Manuscripts of 1844). Early Marx rejects both positions for revolutionary praxis - as it goes beyond idealist and materialist philosophy. Simply to privilege objective or subjective approaches, or truth and reality, does not take account of dialectical conflict that serves to explain praxis in more complex and productive terms. 

The concept of praxis is described by Lefebvre in more detail. Firstly, praxis can be understood as an extension of sensuous human subject, that enters into social relations, and as a result exercises subjective powers of 'activity, reflection, desire'. In this way, human creation can be explained as praxis in which humans transform nature through 'the unity of the sensuous and the intellectual, of nature and culture' (1968: 39). Secondly, human needs, both individual and social needs are satisfied by work, and in doing so 'controls nature and appropriates it in part', in turn transforming needs (1968: 41). In summary, praxis rests on 'the sensuous on the one hand, creative activity stimulated by a need it transforms on the other'. History proves this point. In 'The German Ideology', Marx states that humans 'must be a position to live in order to be able to "make history"' (1978: 155-6). It is a fundamental condition of history to be in position to satisfy the needs of life itself - both in terms of procreation and labour required for natural and social relations (note: it is in The German Ideology that he describes the 'latent slavery' within the family in deflecting the labour-power of others, and in turn indicative of society as a whole). Indeed, work is both productive, and is productive of 'new production needs and needs for production' (1968: 42). Lefebvre says: 'Work is part of a dialectical process "need-work-enjoyment," within which it is one practical and historical "moment" or stage' (1968: 43). 

There is a dynamic here in which new processes emerge and adapt previous processes and the existing social divisions of labour interact with new technologies to form new divisions. Lefebvre is keen to distinguish between two types of labour here - what he calls 'functions' and 'work'. He uses 'poiesis' to refer to labour that gives 'human form to the sensuous' such as the work of a farmer, craft-maker or artist. Praxis however, 'in a broad sense, subsumes poiesis; in the strict sense, it only designates the pragmata, the matters actually deliberated by the members of the society' (1968: 45). The point for Lefebvre is that both within and between poiesis and praxis, work is in conflict with itself (for instance, productive labour is devalued in relation to creative labour, as an individualised practice, within poiesis). Work to Lefebvre is described through a series of contradictions: 
'It is at once individual and social, differentiated and total, qualitative and quantitative, simple and complex, productive and unproductive, heterogeneous and homogeneous. It comes into conflict with nonwork (idleness, leisure). Work qua dialectical process and qua content gives rise to a specific form, the form assumed by the product of physical labor; the commodity.' (1968: 45)
Praxis is thus understood as content (the labour) that creates new forms built on these contradictions. This is evident in the contradictions built into every commodity in terms of use-value and exchange-value - labour produces the commodity and becomes a commodity (more on this elsewhere). The trick of the capitalist, of course, is to hide the content under a deceptive form rather than to reveal the contradictions of value and hence divisions of labour involved.

Praxis is an important concept as it helps to emphasise the point that human activity turns on these dialectical relations between living beings and their works. Lefebvre proposes three levels of praxis: the repetitive, the innovating, and the mimetic that lies between the two others (1968: 51). Repetitive praxis merely performs previous actions within determined cycles; mimetic praxis sometimes breaks out of this imitation but without clear purpose; however creative praxis reaches its highest level in revolutionary activity. This is thoroughly transformative of conservative praxis: 'Revolutionary praxis introduces discontinuities into the overall socio-historical process.' (1968: 52-3). 
In summary:
'Every praxis has two coordinates: one denotes the past, that which has been accomplished, the other the future onto which praxis opens and which it will create.' (Lefebvre, 1968: 55) 


Notes (from entry on 'theory', taken from Raymond Williams, Keywords, 1988: 318 (first published 1976):

By 'praxis', I refer to practice or action informed by theory. Praxis is derived from the Greek as simply practice or action but since the C16th in English has expressed the practice or exercise of an art or an idea, and in specialised contexts is used to express a sense related to theory (where theory is an active interrelation between explanation and things happening or made to happen in controlled situations). It complicated but most usage simply serves to object to the simplistic separation of practice and theory - clearly one informs the otrher and vice versa.  Praxis is a systematic exercise in an understood and organised skill. 

Most significantly, in German (c. 1840), through Hegelian thinking and in turn Marxist, praxis is explicitly practice informed by theory (and theory informed by practice too). In this way, theory is made meaningful and tested by practice. Practice is action (made practical). The opposition of theory and practice is surpassed and privileges practice/action rather than theory (as opposed to theoretical practice or critical practice perhaps). 

Thus, I hope it is clear why I am using the term praxis in the context of a practice-based PhD project.