Alain Joxe (2002), Empire of Disorder, Los Angeles/New York: Semiotext(e).

Overall project:

According to Joxe, we exist in a world exemplified by 'chaos' under the pressure of neo-liberalism. The title of his book Empire of Disorder, sets it in the context of Hardt and Negri's 'Empire' and an understanding of contemporary forms of sovereignty and power. Yet Joxe's project in rather different in implicating complexity theory (not explicitly though) and in his defensive position of seeing European Republics as the best resistance to Empire (note: he is an expert on Peace). He sees the American Empire as the 'Empire of Disorder' and meanwhile positions himself in opposition to this: 
'I defend the idea that Europe, as a pluralistic power and a crossroads of continents, probably represents the primary line of resistance to this empire for structural, and not only ideological reasons but for political and security reasons as well.' (2002: 16)
He sees the power of the United States as not simply economic but military too (proved more so in recent times); a rich mix 'gained by their mastery of the practical effects of the electronic revolution, both in the military, aero-satellite sphere and the economic and financial sphere' leading to 'globalisation' and 'intolerable asymmetrical effects' (2002: 14). It is 'Empire' that regulates disorder.

Empire is as a result of globalisation thus (cf. Hardt and Negri's definition of Empire):
'The general effect of globalisation, its most general strategic definition, could be stated as follows: the disjunction of political, military and economic criteria once coordinated by the state at the geographic level of the state.' (2002: 85)

He sees Hardt and Negri's 'Empire' as lacking crucial analytical questions, in not taking sufficient account of the military question and of seeing globality as only answerable in kind (hence 'globalise resistance'):
'I do not think they have taken the military question seriously enough. They have a somewhat idealistic vision, perhaps even a Clintonian vision, of the expansion of the capitalist system. What we are seeing now calls into doubt not the veracity, but the capacity Negri has to represent the Empire in question.' (2002: 75) 
On the other hand, how is resistance to be characterised? Can this 'chaotic neoconservative order [...] be eliminated by an immediate counter-offensive from those who are nostalgic for the revolutions of 1649, 1793, 1848, 1871, 1917, 1968. Is it at least possible to slow it down, to hinder its progress, to lead the world towards a more pleasant chaos?'[...] (2002: 107)

The choice remains (for Europeans, in his view) of which form of chaos they prefer, in counter distinction to that sense of 'disorder' maintained by the Americans. 

More precisely the 'empire of disorder' that 'claims to order everything through disorder is usually called the market' (2002: 122).  

This asymmetry is partly as a result of the 'decomposition' of Communist power. Disorder can be perceived where Communism has been dismantled along with the Nation State - you cannot do both simultaneously, he claims, without making a big mess - he says; 'No one asked Poland to eliminate Poland. For federations like Russia or Yugoslavia, breaking down the Communist State has been more destructive' (2002: 28). Perhaps, the more current disorder in Iraq can be seen in this light too in that an ideological battle ensues between Western and Islamic notions of ruling 'order'. He sees conflict as far more complex than, for instance, Samuel Huntington's theory of the 'clash of civilisations' (2002: 91) - is the clash between industrial civilisation and the computer civilisation the next step in a civil war (as Toffler remarks, in Joxe, 2002: 208). One would have to look at the interrelations between political, military, financial and religion for a more useful understanding of the complexities at work.  

He sees this as the crucial site of contradictions of power drawing particularly upon the work of Hobbes and Clausewitz. He asks:
'Is globalism inherently violent and apolitical, ie. bent on destroying popular sovereignty?' (2002: 175)

He maintains that, under the forces of globalisation, the desire for the elimination of all nations (apart from one of course - USA) will lead to complete disorder unless alternatives are sought. As the one nation to survive, American ideology is caught in an internal and irredeemable contradiction as it ultimately weakens its own sense of internal order and democracy.

Empire + Complexity:

He sees chaos as a global idea and complexity as something that can be deciphered at a local level that is generally less chaotic (not sure about this - surely is manifest at every level) (2002: 22).

'The world today is united by a new form of chaos, an imperial chaos, dominated by the imperium of the United States, though not controlled by it. We lack the words to describe this new system, while being surrounded by its images. (2002: 78)

-- 

Disorder is traditionally useful of course, when existed order needs to be transgressed but now power is more complex and has taken the form of resistance itself. Order is expressed through disorder if you like. In such a scenario, the strategic standpoint of resistance seems powerless to resist power. Politics requires new forms, arguably.

'In the absence of a declared enemy, the most formidable enemy one must face in politics is disorder. [...] Disorder is present everywhere, like liberty, and this type of threat is never lacking as long as an elite brings it to the fore. This is the case today, although only because neo-liberal ideology (the "universal language" that has taken over the ideological sphere dominated by corporate presidents) paradoxically considers disorder to be positive and order negative, the equivalent to an abuse of power. Yet the representation of disorder as something harmful was the original source of the political desire for order.' (2002: 118)  
'Isn't a defence still possible, first through an ethical refusal and then by basing resistance on the structure of chaos itself? By reshaping their oligarchic power through control of the electronic chaos, the oligarchs have a head start. Need we believe that the people as a multitude, the nation as a pact, the state as a local reason are incapable of establishing a non-hierarchical, pluralist action against the real and symbolic power of the electronic aristocracies ....' (2002: 108-9)

It begins to sound more like complexity theory, when he says:

'Disorder is only a new beginning becaiuse it potentially contains a variety of possible orders, a variety of scales of possible orders. Disorder always opens a new choice of degrees of order.' (2002: 121) 
He sees periods of disturbance and disorder recurring in rhythm across history, in cycles of power than decompose and recompose. 

Freely organised crime, the prevalence of mafias and dual economies have become allies to free trade - leaving the distinction thoroughly unclear 'between the criminal economy and the transnational economy in general' (2002: 157). There is no such thing as dirty money - or rather, all money is dirty.

He says '... we need to rid ourselves of this Disneyland political logic and face up to the complex system that creates a coherent link between omnipresent violence and the peaceful expansion of the free-market economy' (2002: 161). 
This violence is computerised and networked. Communications networks that appear disorderly and unregulated are increasingly controlled and hierarchicised. According to Joxe, Fukuyama was premature in declaring the 'end of history' because of 'politico-military sovereignties maintaining spaces that prevent total market economy unification' (2002: 195) - the so-called ';axis of evil' all represent counter structures to the neoliberal model expressed as Marxist states (China, Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba) or a state-controlled economy (Iran, Serbia, and until recently Iraq). 

Furthermore, 'Class conflict has not disappeared but... should be now be inscribed at a global level' but this makes the dominant class increasingly hard to identify (2002: 201). It appears in neo-Darwinist terms as the superiority of one species that eliminates the other species (2002: 207).