Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers (1985), Order Out of Chaos: ManÕs New Dialogue With Nature, London: Fontana.

On the problem of time, Prigogine and Stengers state: 'The world is far from homogeneous. Therefore the question can be put in different terms: What is the specific structure of dynamic systems that permits them to "distinguish" between past and future? What is the minimum complexity involved?' (1985: 16) Progress can be conceived in these terms. They cite Boltzman who investigated the correlation of probability and irreversibility: 'Only when a system behaves in a random way may the difference between past and future, and therefore irreversibility, enter into its description.' (1985: 16) In this way, the future and the past are both contained within the present (or that there can be no 'one time-directed evolution'. This examination of the laws of motion is far from a new endeavour. Since Galileo, scientists have been concerned with acceleration, and in particular in accounting for the change of state from rest to motion and motion to rest. Newton's work on gravity and the motion of bodies falling to earth is another obvious example. As an aside, Prigogine and Stengers claim that the Newtonian concept of change 'appears to be a synthesis of the science of ideal machines, where motion is transmitted without collision or friction between parts already in contact, and the science of celestial bodies interacting at a distance.' (1985: 63) - put another way, a synthesis of a mathematical view of motion and ideas from the occult. Prigogine and Stengers describe how the laws of change, of time's impact on nature, are expressed in terms of the characteristics of trajectories: lawfulness, determinism, and reversibility. (1985: 60) In dynamical systems, time and space work together to produce motion.

In the manner of theses on the philosophy of history' or indeed Bergson - their argument tries to weave together scientific and cultural insights - to avoid what Koyrˇ calls 'Two worlds: This means two truths. Or no truth at all.' (in Prigogine & Stengers, 1985: 36) The two world need to be forced together, as 'a clash of doctrines is not a disaster, it is an opportunity' (Whitehead, quoted in Prigogine and Stengers, 1985: 213) The 'clash of doctrines' they are thinking of, is between being and becoming, and between probability and irreversibility. They propose a new synthesis.

This skepticism over the idea of progress and the accumulation of knowledge leads Prigogine and Stengers to examine the limits of science by applying a history of ideas that approaches reality in a quite different manner. For instance, Bergson's opposition to scientific thinking was in the form of speculative knowledge and intuition. Hegel represents a more cosmic dimension: 'In his system increasing levels of complexity are specified, and nature's purpose is the eventual self-realization of its spiritual element.' (1985: 89) To Prigogine and Stengers, Hegelian thinking rests on the 'qualitative difference between the simple behavior described by mechanics and the behavior of more complex entities such as living beings.' (1985: 89) At each iteration of a level in the dialectical hierarchy, there is a corresponding increase in complexity in nature. 

In recognition of the limits of scientific and cultural knowledge, a science of complexity is posited. According to Prigogine's thinking, all systems contain subsystems that are continually fluctuating. It is possible that one or more fluctuation, as a result of feedback, may change the preexisting organisation of the system. This is a 'revolutionary' moment, or 'bifurcation point', where it is impossible to predict the direction change will take, and whether it will fall into a higher level of order or disintegrate into chaos. One of the properties of the evolution of a complex system is that multiple interacting elements in a system cannot be 'governed'. The collective behaviour cannot be predicted at a global level. For instance:
'A society defined entirely in terms of a functional model would correspond to the Aristotelian idea of natural hierarchy and order. Each official would perform the duties for which he [sic] has been appointed. These duties would translate at each level the different aspects of the organization of the society as a whole. The king gives orders to the architect, the architect to the contractor, the contractor to the worker. On the contrary, termites and other social insects seem to approach the "statistical" model. As we have seen, there seems to be no mastermind behind the construction of the termites' nest, when interactions among individuals produce certain types of collective behaviour in some circumstances, but none of these interactions refer to any global task, being all purely local.' (1985: 205)
And importantly, this model of 'order through fluctuations' suggest that in an unstable world or system, small changes can have large effects, but this is not arbitrary. The argument maintains that new order and organisation can arise spontaneously from disorder through self-organisation. In conclusion, they state that 'societies are immensely complex systems involving a potentially enormous number of bifurcations exemplified by the variety of cultures that have evolved in the relatively short span of human history. We know that such systems are highly sensitive to fluctuations. This leads both to hope and a threat: hope, since even small fluctuations may grow and change the overall structure. As a result, individual activity is not doomed to insignificance. On the other hand, this is also a threat, since in our universe the security of stable, permanent rules seems gone forever.' They cite Neher in characterising history as 'branded with the mark of radical uncertainty'. (1985: 312-3)


praxis:
Scientific thinking is predicated on theory and practice: the desire to shape the world and to understand it - activity as opposed to passive observation.